Biden’s last jab at China: Curbs on memory chips, chipmakers, investors

But while Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo said that these new curbs will help prevent “China from advancing its domestic semiconductor manufacturing system” to modernize its military, analysts and “several US officials” told The Post that they pack “far less punch” than the prior two rounds of export controls.

Analysts told The Wall Street Journal that the US took too long to launch the controls, which were composed around June. As industry insiders weighed in on the restrictions, word got out about the US plans to expand controls. In the months since, analysts said, China had plenty of time to stockpile the now-restricted tech. Applied Materials, for example, saw an eye-popping 86 percent spike in net revenue from products shipped to China “in the nine months ending July 28,” the WSJ reported.

Because of this and other alleged flaws, it’s unclear how effectively Biden’s final attempts to block China from accessing the latest US technologies will work.

Beyond concerns that China had time to stockpile tech it anticipated would be restricted, Gregory Allen, the director at the Wadhwani AI Center at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told the WSJ that these latest controls “left loopholes that Huawei and Chinese companies could exploit.”

Loopholes include failing to blacklist companies that Huawei regularly uses—with allies and American companies allegedly lobbying to exempt factories or fabs they like, such as ChangXin Memory Technologies Inc., “one of China’s largest memory chipmakers,” The Post noted. They also include failing to restrict older versions of the HBM chips and various chip-making equipment that China may still be able to easily access, Allen said.

“These controls are weaker than what the United States should have done,” Allen told The Post. “You can make a halfway logical argument that says, ‘Sell everything to China.’ Then you can make a reasonable argument, ‘Sell very little to China.’ But the worst thing you can do is to dramatically signal your intention to cut off China’s access to tech but then have so many loopholes and such bungled implementation that you incur almost all of the costs of the policy with only a fraction of the benefits.”